In this paper, we study the receiver performance with physical layer security in a Poisson field of interferers. We compare the performance in two deployment scenarios: (i) the receiver is located at the corner of a quadrant, (ii) the receiver is located in the infinite plane. When the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is not available at the transmitter, we calculate the probability of secure connectivity using the Wyner coding scheme, and we show that hiding the receiver at the corner is beneficial at high rates of the transmitted codewords and detrimental at low transmission rates. When the CSI is available, we show that the average secrecy capacity is higher when the receiver is located at the corner, even if the intensity of interferers over there is four times higher than the intensity of interferers in the bulk. Therefore boundaries can also be used as a secrecy enhancement technique for high data rate applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the forecasted deployment of indoor ultra-dense wireless networks, it becomes important to develop models that consider the impact of boundaries in the performance analysis [1] - [6] . It is well-known that close to the boundary, the connection probability degrades due to isolation [1] , [5] , but it improves in terms of interference [2] , [4] . Analytical models considering finite deployment areas have so far been used to study spatial and temporal interference aspects [2] - [4] , optimize the base station density in cellular networks [2] , assess millimeter-wave network performance [6] , etc.
Physical layer security (PLS) without exchanging secret keys was first proposed by Wyner [7] and refers to the protection of information messages against eavesdropping with the aid of channel coding. PLS would be well-suited for devices with light computational power, e.g., in certain types of sensor networks, where conventional security techniques fail to adapt [8] . Nevertheless, the impact of boundaries on connectivity and rate with PLS has so far received limited attention.
A great deal of research has adopted a type of random geometric graphs, known as the secrecy graph [9] - [11] , and studied the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) of the in-and out-connectivity degree with PLS, the isolation probabilities, percolation threholds, etc. Another category of research considered the impact of interference on PLS, and applied stochastic geometry to study the performance for the typical user in networks with infinite extent [12] - [15] .
In [12] , the trade-off between the connection and the secrecy probabilities in cellular systems is studied, and in [13] it is shown that cluttered environments and blockage can be helpful in meeting secrecy constraints. In [14] , secure vehicleto-vehicle communication is considered; a subset of antennas is used for beamforming towards the receiver, while the rest send jamming signals towards other directions. In [15] , relays forward the data between the sensors and the sinks, and their density is optimized for maximizing the average secrecy rate.
In general, protecting the information messages against eavesdropping with PLS comes along with a cost on the connection probability [12] and the throughput [16] . To mitigate the cost, secrecy enhancement techniques may be applied, especially when the density of eavesdroppers exceeds a threshold [17] . When the channel state information (CSI) of the intended receiver is known, eigen-beamforming can be used to maximize the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the intended channel [18] . Eigen-beamforming outperforms sectoring at the cost of knowing the CSI instead of the direction [18] . Secrecy can be further enhanced when artificial noise is transmitted to the direction of the other sectors or to the null space of the intended channel [19] . When the transmitter can obtain some information about the location of the eavesdroppers, guard zones can be constructed; each transmitter will send confidential information when its guard zone is free from eavesdroppers, and the secrecy transmission capacity, especially under high security constraints, is enhanced [16] .
The information theoretic approaches [9] - [11] and the analysis using stochastic geometry [12] - [19] assume that the locations of the transmitters and the eavesdroppers follow the uniform distribution in the infinite plane. To the best of our knowledge, the only available study considering the impact of boundaries on secrecy performance is [20] . This work neglects the interference effects, and shows that the mean in-and outconnectivity degrees with PLS are not necessarily equal, unlike in the infinite plane.
With boundaries, the interference field becomes nonhomogeneous. Therefore a natural question to ask is whether placing the receiver close to the boundary, where the interference is less, can enhance PLS. Before looking at the impact of boundaries on the secrecy performance, let us consider the homogeneous scenario, where the receiver and the eavesdropper are deployed in the infinite plane (or in the bulk of the deployment area), and discuss the impact of interferer's intensity on the probability of secure connectivity, i.e., the joint event of successful decoding at the receiver and failure to decode at the eavesdropper [21] , [22] . We assume a single receiver and a single eavesdropper at fixed and known locations in a Poisson field of interferers. The signal level over the main and the eavesdropper channels stay the same; it is only the interference level changing. When the intensity of interferers decreases, the interference level becomes less at the receiver and the eavesdropper. In that case, the probability of secure connectivity should decrease at low rates of the transmitted codewords (with reference to the Wyner encoding scheme), because the eavesdropper becomes capable of decoding low-rate transmissions almost surely. On the other hand, at high rates of the transmitted codewords, the probability of secure connectivity should increase because the performance is dominated by the connection probability of the receiver, which increases under a lower intensity of interferers. The above discussion gives an initial insight into the impact of boundaries on secure connectivity but it does not reveal the complete story. Placing the receiver close to the boundary is not equivalent to placing the receiver in the bulk along with a reduction in the intensity of interferers. The boundary may introduce a trade-off which does not exist in the bulk and it is discussed next.
Let us consider a quadrant, where the receiver is placed at the corner, i.e., at the point of minimum interference, and the eavesdropper along the side. The interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper is correlated because it is due to the same set of interferers [23] . We will show that the spatial correlation of interference is higher along the boundary than in the bulk, for the same distance separation between the receiver and the eavesdropper. Therefore placing the receiver at the corner is detrimental for PLS because the reception conditions at the receiver and the eavesdropper become favorable at the same time. On the other hand, placing the receiver at the corner should benefit PLS because the eavesdropper is exposed to higher interference than the receiver. The motivation of this paper is to study this interplay.
The impact of interference correlation on the probability of secure connectivity in infinite cellular systems has been recently studied in [22] . Over there it is shown that interference correlation plays a significant role in secrecy performance when the typical eavesdropper is located close to the typical user. In this paper, we consider an ad hoc type of system and compare the receiver performance at the corner and in the bulk considering both cases with known and unknown CSI of the eavesdropper channel at the transmitter. We will show that when the CSI is not available, the boundary is beneficial/detrimental at high/low transmission rates. In addition, when the transmitter can adapt the rate based on the instantaneous CSI, the average capacity with PLS is higher at the corner even if the intensity of interferers over there is four times higher than the intensity of interferers in the bulk. This means that the impact of higher interference at the eavesdropper than at the receiver dominates over the higher correlation of interference.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model. In Section III, we calculate the mean, the variance, the correlation coefficient of interference, and the connection probability of the receiver and the eavesdropper. In Section IV, we calculate the probability of secure connectivity assuming that the CSI is not available at the transmitter. In Section V, we assume perfect knowledge of the CSI and calculate the average secrecy capacity. Section IV and Section V contain the main analysis of this paper and the comparison of the receiver performance at the boundary and in the bulk. In Section VI, we summarize the results of this paper and outline future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an ad hoc network where the locations of the transmitters follow the Poisson Point Process (PPP) with intensity λ, and each receiver is placed at a fixed link distance d 0 and a random angle θ from the associated transmitter, see Fig. 1 for an illustration. We would like to assess the performance, i.e., connectivity and rate, with PLS. In areas with boundaries, the performance is location-dependent. We consider two locations for the receiver: at the corner of a quadrant and in the bulk of the deployment area. In addition, we consider a single eavesdropper which is located at distance u from the receiver. When the receiver is located at the corner, the eavesdropper is located at the boundary. The locations of the receiver and the eavesdropper are fixed and known. The origin of the coordinate system is set at the location of the receiver unless otherwise stated. The location of the eavesdropper is (u, 0). The transmitter, the receiver and the eavesdropper are equipped with a single antenna. The eavesdropper does not employ any advanced technique for intercepting the transmitter's message, e.g., successive interference cancellation, and the ad hoc network does not apply any secrecy enhancement technique, e.g., artificial noise.
Considering just a single eavesdropper at an arbitrary location may seem overly simplistic, but it is used to get an insight on the performance comparison with and without boundaries. Considering two-dimensional random locations for the eavesdroppers has been left as a future topic to study but the main conclusions of this paper are unlikely to change. After all, a high (low) intensity of eavesdroppers means that the distance separation between the receiver and the most detrimental eavesdropper would be small (large), and the results of this paper are still applicable.
In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, we normalize the link distance d 0 to unity, d 0 = 1, and the transmit power level to unity. When the receiver is located at the corner, the location of the transmitter associated to it, hereafter the transmitter, is (cos θ, sin θ), where the Random Variable (RV) θ follows the uniform distribution in 0, π 2 , thus f Θ (θ) = 2 π . In the bulk, the location of the transmitter should naturally follow the uniform distribution in [0, 2π]. Nevertheless, we would like to compare the receiver performance at the two locations on a fair basis. In order to do that, the distribution of signal level over the eavesdropper channel should stay the same. Therefore we constrain the location of the transmitter over 0, π 2 in both cases. We denote by Z the RV describing the distance-based propagation pathloss over the eavesdropper channel, Z = g e jΘ −u , where g (r) = min (1, r −η ) is the distance-based propagation pathloss function and η > 2 stands for the pathloss exponent. The PDF f Z (z) is derived in the Appendix.
Due to the Slivnyak's Theorem, the locations of the transmitters generating interference to the receiver and the eavesdropper, hereafter the interferers (or the users), follow a PPP with intensity λ. Their transmission probability is ξ. For a high intensity of active users λξ, the impact of noise can be ignored in the performance assessment. The fast fading h over all channels, i.e., main channel, eavesdropper channel and interfering channels is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) following the exponential PDF with unit mean E {h} = 1. The assumption of independent fast fading between the receiver and the eavesdropper should be valid for distances u larger than half the wavelength. We assume that the considered distances meet this constraint.
In order to assess the performance with secrecy, we follow the Wyner encoding scheme [7] , where the rate of transmitted codewords is R t , and the rate of confidential messages is R s . Let us denote by γ x,r the RV describing the instantaneous Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) at the receiver, where x ∈ {bu,co} indicates the reveiver location in the bulk or at the corner. The connection probability of the receiver can be calculated as P c x,r = P {γ x,r > µ}, where µ = 2 Rt − 1. Similarly, let us denote by γ x,e (u) the RV describing the SIR at the eavesdropper, and by P c
x,e (u) = P {γ x,e (u) > σ} the probability that the eavesdropper succeeds to decode the transmitter's message. According to the Wyner scheme, σ = 2 Re − 1, where the rate R e = R t −R s reflects the rate cost to secure the message against the eavesdropper. For a positive secrecy rate R s ≤ R t , it is required that µ ≥ σ. When the CSI of the main and the eavesdropper channels is not available at the transmitter, the rates R t , R s are kept fixed. A pair of rates (R t , R s ) can be associated with a probability of secure connectivity, P sc x , which can be expressed as the joint event [21] , [22] P sc x (u) = P (γ x,r > µ, γ x,e (u) < σ) .
When the CSI at the receiver and the eavesdropper is perfectly known, the transmitter can adapt the transmission rate equal to max 0, log 1+γx,r 1+γx,e based on the instantaneous CSI, and the performance is described in terms of average secrecy capacity [24] , [25] .
where f r,e (γ x,r , γ x,e ) is the joint PDF of the SIR at the receiver and the eavesdropper. While studying the performance with secrecy, we will need the mean and the variance of interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper, the correlation of interference between the two locations, and the connection probabilities. These quantities are calculated in the next section.
III. INTERFERENCE MOMENTS AND CONNECTION

PROBABILITY
In the bulk, the mean and the variance of interference are independent of the location. Therefore it suffices to calculate the moments of interference at the receiver
where (a) and (b) follow after taking into account the piecewise nature of the propagation pathloss function g(·), and the factor 2 in the calculation of the variance comes from the second moment of a unit-mean exponential RV, E h 2 = 2.
The mean and the variance of interference at the corner of a quadrant can be calculated after scaling the respective statistics in the bulk, see equation (3), by 1 4 
In addition, the mean and the variance of the interference at the eavesdropper located at the boundary and at distance u from the corner become easier to calculate after shifting the origin to (u, 0).
where φ co (u, r) = π for r ≤ u, and φ co (u, r) = π − arccos u r for r > u. After differentiating equations (4) with respect to u using the integral rule, one may show that the mean and the variance increase as we move away from the corner. Therefore an eavesdropper at the boundary is exposed to higher interference than the receiver at the corner. Due to the piecewise nature of the propagation pathloss function, we have to separate between two cases, u ≷ 1, in equation (4), before expressing E {I co,e (u)} and Var {I co,e (u)} in semi-closed form. . Spatial correlation coefficient of interference at distance u from the receiver. The receiver is placed at the corner and in the bulk. In the numerator of equation (6), the integral is evaluated numerically. At the corner, equation (6) is verified with simulations. Pathloss exponent η = 4, and user density λ = 0.2.
In order to calculate the covariance of interference between the receiver and the eavesdropper, one should keep in mind that the set of interferers for the two locations are fully correlated. The Pearson correlation coefficient takes the following form:
where x ∈ {co, bu}, φ bu = 2π, φ co = π 2 , and the interference in the bulk does not depend on the location, thus Var{I bu,e (u)} = Var{I bu,r } ∀u.
Note that the correlation coefficient ρ x is independent of the user density λ and user activity ξ. In addition, we have seen that the user activity is just a scaling factor in the calculation of the mean and variance. Hereafter, we omit the activity probability from the expressions for brevity, and the user intensity λ describes the intensity of users after thinning with the activity probability.
In Fig. 2 , we depict the correlation coefficient at the corner and in the bulk with respect to the distance u. We see that placing the receiver at the corner increases the spatial correlation of interference for the same distance separation between the receiver and the eavesdropper.
In order to calculate the connection probability of the receiver in the interference-limited regime, we need to evaluate the Laplace Transform of the interference P c x,r = E e −sIx,r [27] . Using the Probability Generating Functional (PGFL) of the PPP we get where s = µ g(d0) = µ since the link distance d 0 has been taken equal to unity.
Let us assume for the moment that the location of the transmitter is fixed and known. In order to calculate the connection probability of the eavesdropper in the bulk, one should substitute φ x = 2π, and s e = σ g( e jθ −u ) = σz −1 instead of µ in equation (7b).
When the eavesdropper is located at the boundary, one should substitute s e instead of s, and φ co (u, r) instead of φ x in equation (7a). After shifting the origin to (u, 0) and separating between u ≷ 1 in the double integral in equation (7a), we get
where I 1 = se+r η dr. If we bound the inverse trigonometric function as, π − arccos u r > π 2 + u r , ∀r ≥ u, we may get a tight upper bound on the connection probability of the eavesdropper after substituting the following lower bound approximations in the above equations
x . The tightness of the bound is illustrated in Fig. 3 . The connection probability of the eavesdropper decreases rapidly along the boundary because the interference becomes higher over there, and at the same time the signal level over the eavesdropper channel decreases. The trend is similar when the location of the transmitter follows the uniform distribution. In that case, the connection probability can be calculated after integrating (numerically) equations (8)−(9b) over the PDF of the signal level over the eavesdropper channel f Z (z).
The connection probabilities for fixed and known transmitter's location given in equations (8) and (9b) would be of use in Section IV while approximating the probability of secure connectivity at high transmission rates R t and large distance separation u between the receiver and the eavesdropper. For a large u, the correlation coefficient of interference may become negligible, see Fig. 2 , and the probability of secure connectivity can be approximated as the product of the connection probability of the receiver with the complementary of the connection probability of the eavesdropper. We will expand the connection probability of the eavesdropper for σ → 0/σ → ∞ to approximate the probability of secure connectivity for high/low secrecy rates R s under the assumption of uncorrelated interference.
IV. PROBABILITY OF SECURE CONNECTIVITY − UNKNOWN CSI
Using that the fading over the main and the eavesdropper channels is Rayleigh, the probability of secure connectivity in equation (1) can be read as
where J x (u) = E e −sIx,r−seIx,e(u) is the joint connection probability of the receiver and the eavesdropper. In a recently published paper [22] , the quantity J x (u) has been calculated taking into account the fact that the interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper is correlated. In order to take into account the correlation of interference in our problem setting, we condition on the location θ of the transmitter, and we average over the fading states of the interfering channels at the receiver and the eavesdropper, as well as over the locations and activities of the interferers. After using the PGFL of the PPP and the fact that the fading samples in the interfering channels at the receiver and the eavesdropper are i.i.d. unit-mean exponential RVs we get [22] 
where S x is the infinite plane for x = bu and the upper-right quadrant for x = co, dS = rdrdφ is the integration element, d = re jφ − u is the distance between the integration element and the eavesdropper, s e = σz −1 , and z = g e jθ − u is the realization of the RV Z describing the distance-based pathloss over the eavesdropper channel.
Lemma 1. For low transmission rates R t , the probability of secure connectivity is higher in the bulk than at the corner.
Proof.
A low rate R t necessitates a low SIR threshold µ.
After setting s = µ in equation (7a), expanding at µ = 0, and keeping up to the second order terms, we can approximate the connection probability for low rates R t as follows
In order to approximate the quantity J x (u) in equation (12) for low rates R t , we expand around σz −1 = 0 and µ = 0, again keeping up to the second order terms. 
After subtracting equation (16) from equation (13) we get
Recall that in the bulk the interference is independent of the location u, and the probability for secure connectivity can be simplified after substituting E {I bu,r } instead of E{I bu,e (u)} in equation (15) . In addition, due to the fact that E{I co,e (u)} ≤ lim u→∞ E{I co,e (u)} = 1 2 E{I bu,r } ∀u, the probability for secure connectivity at the corner, for low rates R t , can be upperbounded after substituting 1 2 E{I bu,r } instead of E{I co,e (u)} in the first-order term in equation (15) . Finally, we get that lim σ→0,µ→0 (b) Rs = 0 Fig. 4 . Validating the approximations for the probability of secure connectivity at low transmission rates Rt. (a) The approximation is given in equation (15) . The rate of the transmitter codewords is Rt = log 2 (1 + µ). (b) The approximation is given in equation (16) . The secrecy rate is Rs = 0, i.e., µ = σ. In both figures, the exact probability is calculated numerically based on equations (11) and (12) . Pathloss exponent η = 4, user density λ = 0.2, distance u = 1.
transmission due to unfortunate interference conditions, and at the same time the receiver can successfully decode.
A case of particular interest is R s = 0, or equivalently, µ = σ γ. The probability of secure connectivity in equation (15) is simplified to
The accuracy of approximation (15) for the probability of secure connectivity at the corner and in the bulk is illustrated in Fig. 4a w.r.t. the secrecy rate R s ≤ R t and a low rate R t . The accuracy of equation (16) is illustrated in Fig. 4b w. r.t. the rate R t . In both figures we see that the performance in the bulk is superior to the corner. Lemma 2. For high transmission rates R t and large distance separation u between the receiver and the eavesdropper, the probability of secure connectivity is higher at the corner than in the bulk.
Proof. For a large distance separation u, we may assume that the interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper is uncorrelated. In that case, the joint connection probability J x (u) is equal to the product of the connection probabilities of the receiver and the eavesdropper, and the probability of secure connectivity in equation (11) is simplified to P sc x (u) = P c x,r 1 − E e −seIx,e(u) . For a high transmission rate R t or equivalently for a large µ, the connection probability of the receiver at the corner, see equation (7b), can be approximated as P c co,r ≈ e − λπµ 2/η 4sinc(2π/η) . In the bulk, the exponent should be scaled by four, P c bu,r ≈ e − λπµ 2/η sinc(2π/η) . The connection probability of the eavesdropper at the boundary, P c co,e (u) = E e −seIco,e(u) , can be approximated after substituting I u from equation (10b) into (9b). For a low secrecy rate R s , or equivalently for a large σ, we can approximate the connection probability of the eavesdropper as
. In order to obtain a lower bound for the probability of secure connectivity at the corner, we can upper-bound the connection probability of the eavesdropper at the boundary. One way to do that is to fix the signal level over the eavesdropper channel at the maximum value z 2 = (u − 1) −η , see the Appendix. Finally, we get
In the bulk, the connection probability of the eavesdropper for a low secrecy rate R s can be approximated as P c bu,e ≈ E Z e − λπσ 2/η z −2/η sinc(2π/η) . An upper-bound for the probability of secure connectivity can be obtained by fixing the signal level over the eavesdropper channel at the minimum value z 1 = 1 + u 2 −η/2 . Finally, we get
Let us denote x = λπ 4sinc(2π/η) and y = λu(u−1) sinc(π/η) . In order to show that lim µ→∞
= 0, which is true. For R s = 0, or equivalently µ = σ γ, we also get that lim γ→∞ exp(−4xγ 2/η )(1−exp(−4xγ 2/η (1+u 2 ))) exp(−xγ 2/η )(1−exp(−xγ 2/η (u−1) 2 −yγ 1/η )) = 0.
When the secrecy rate R s is high, or equivalently σ is low, one can approximate the connection probability of the eavesdropper after substituting equation (10b) into (9b) and expanding around σ = 0.
Since σ → 0, it is straightforward to show that lim µ→∞ P sc bu (u) P sc co (u) < 1, and the proof is complete. (17) for the corner, and in equation (18) for the bulk at high transmission rates Rt, low transmission rates Rs and large distance separation u. The distance is selected u = 3. The rest of the parameter settings can be found in the caption of Fig. 4 . The exact probability is calculated numerically after substituting equation (12) into (11) . In (a) we depict the results only pertinent to the corner because the probability of secure connectivity at high transmission rates Rt in the bulk is very low.
The intuitive explanation of Lemma 2 is as follows: For a large distance separation u, the signal level over the eavesdropper channel becomes low, and the probability of secure connectivity at high transmission rates R t is dominated by the connection probability of the receiver. Therefore the performance is better at the corner, where the interference level is lower than in the bulk.
The accuracy of the approximations for the probability of secure connectivity in Lemma 2 is illustrated in Fig. 5 for distance separation u = 3. At this distance, the correlation coefficient is less than 10 −1 both at the corner and in the bulk, see Fig. 2 . In Fig. 5a , we see that for decreasing σ, or equivalently, for increasing secrecy rate R s the approximation accuracy degrades. As expexted, the approximation accuracy improves for increasing rate R t (or µ). In Fig. 5a , we also see that for high transmission rates R t , we can allow for increasing secrecy rates R s over some range, without a noticeable decrease in the probability of secure connectivity. Finally, we note that the approximation given in equation (18) for the bulk is an upper bound only for high µ, σ, which is not visible in Fig. 5b .
For small distances u, the impact of correlated interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper should not be ignored. Extending Lemma 2 for small u and a positive secrecy rate R s is tedious. We show the extension only for secrecy rate R s = 0, or µ = σ γ. Lemma 3. For high transmission rates R t and small distance separation u between the receiver and the eavesdropper, the probability of secure connectivity is higher at the corner than in the bulk for secrecy rate R s = 0.
Proof. Let us assume that u ≤ 1 since the correlation coefficient of interference is large for small distances u. In addition, let us assume that γ ≥ 1 since we consider high transmission rates R t . First, we will approximate the term J x (u) at high transmission rates R t , then the connection probability of the receiver.
In order to approximate the term J x (u), we note that for u ≤ 1, the signal level over the eavesdropper channel becomes equal to one with probability p, while it takes values from the continuous distribution f Zc with probability (1−p), see the Appendix for the definition and the derivation of the PDF f Zc (z). Due to the fact that the RV Z follows a mixture distribution for u ≤ 1, the quantity J x (u) in equation (12) can be read as
where z 1 = 1 + u 2 −η/2 is the minimum signal level and z 2 is the maximum signal level over the eavesdropper channel. Next, we show how to approximate the integral I(u) = π/2 0 ∞ 0
1+γg(d) dS at the corner for a large γ. In order to do that, we will divide the quadrant S co into disjoint regions and select a suitable expansion for the terms is more involved as it does not depend only on r, but also on φ. We will split the plane into three regions w.r.t. the distance r: r < r 0 , r 0 ≤ r ≤ r 0 +u and r > r 0 +u. The corresponding integral contributions are denoted by I j (u), I(u) = (d) . On the other hand, for r < r 0 and φ > φ(r), the distance to the eavesdropper becomes large, thus the term γg(d) becomes small, and 1 1+γg(d) ≈ 1−γg(d)+γ 2 g 2 (d). Finally, the integral I 1 (u) can be approximated as
Let us define r 1 = r 0 +u. For r 0 ≤ r ≤ r 1 , the term γg(r) becomes small, while the term γg(d) might be small or large depending on the angle.
Finally, for r > r 1 , both terms γg(r) , γg(d) become small independent of the angle φ, thus
In order to approximate I(u) we need to sum up the approximations from the different regions. For a small u and a large γ, we get that φ(r) ≈ π 2 ∀r ≤ r 0 and r 1 ≈ r 0 . Therefore, the terms that dominate the integral I(u) is the first term in equation (20) and equation (22) . Next, we show how to approximate the dominant terms at a high rate R t or equivalently for a large γ.
Since r 1 > 1, the leading order approximation for the integral π/2 0 ∞ r1 γg(r) − γ 2 g 2 (r) dS is calculated after substituting g(r) = r −η and performing the integration. Finally, we get ηπγ 2/η 4(η−1)(η−2) . On the other hand, the integral π/2 0 ∞ r1 γg(d)−γ 2 g 2 (d) dS cannot be conputed in closedform. Nevertheless, after approximating g(d) , g 2 (d) for a large r, i.e., g(d) ≈ r −η + ηr −1−η u cos φ and g 2 (d) ≈ r −2η + 2ηr −1−2η u cos φ, which should be valid for r 1 ≫ u, we get ηπγ 2/η 4(η−1)(η−2) + ηuγ 1/η (2η−1)(η−1) . Using the large r approximation for g(d), the integral γ 2 π/2 0 ∞ r1 g(r) g(d)dS is approximated as πγ 2/η 4(η−1) − (2η(π−1)−π)uγ 1/η 4η−2 for a large γ.
The term
uγ 1/η , and the term π 2 0 r0 0 1− 
In order to approximate the second integral in equation (19), we note that the behaviour of the term γz −1 g(d) depends on the signal level z which is continuous over [z 1 , z 2 ). One way The connection probability of the receiver (blue curves) is calculated at the corner using equation (7b) and approximated using equation (28) . The quantity Jco(u) (black curves) is calculated numerically based on equation (12) and approximated using equation (25) . The probability of secure connectivity (red curves) is evaluated after substracting Jco from the connection probability. Pathloss exponent η = 4, user density λ = 0.2, distance u = 1 2 .
to simplify the approximation is to bound the integral using the maximum value of the signal level,
dS.
(24) We can expand the right-hand side of the above inequality similar to equations (20)− (22) . Though, we will have to modify some of the integration limits and the way that the angle φ (r), separating between small and large distances d, is computed. Firstly, in order to calculate the term I 1 (u), we will still carry out the integration over 0 ≤ r ≤ γ 1/η , but the angle φ(r) = min π 2 , arccos r 2 +u 2 −(γ/z2) 2/η 2ur . Secondly, the term I 2 (u) is calculated after integrating over
, and using the updated expression for φ (r). Finally, the term I 3 (u) is calculated after integrating over r ≥ u+ γ z2 2/η . Note that for u ≤ 1, we have z 2 = 1, and the probability p to experience signal level Z = 1 at the eavesdropper is larger than 1 2 , see the Appendix. Therefore using p = 1, in the calculation of J co (u) for small distance separations u ≤ 1 introduces small approximation error, see Fig. 6 (set of black curves).
Finally, recall that all approximations made, i.e., expansion for the terms 1 1+γg(r) , 1 1+γg(d) in equations (20)−(22), leading order terms in equation (23) and inequality (24) are lower bounds to the integrals, thus the approximation would upperbound the quantity J co (u), see Fig. 6 .
Following similar steps, the integral I(u) in the bulk is dominated by the following two terms for a large γ and a small distance separation u
where the factor 2 is used to account for angles π ≤ φ ≤ 2π.
The leading order terms in equation (26) can be computed following similar steps to equation (23)
Comparing with equation (23), we see that the coefficient of γ 2/η in the bulk, as expected, it is equal to the respective coefficient at the corner after scaling by four. In addition, in the bulk, the approximation of the integral I(u) at high transmission rates does not require a correction term depending on the distance separation u. This is due to the following reasons: (i) in the bulk, the mean and the variance of interference are location-independent and, (ii) the terms 2γ 2 π 0 ∞ r1 g(r)g(d)dS and 2γ 4 π 0 ∞ r1 g 2 (r)g 2 (d)dS accept a total correction −4πuγ 1/η at high rates, but this is cancelled out due to the terms 2γ 3 π 0 ∞ r1 g 2 (r)g(d)dS and 2γ 3 π 0 ∞ r1 g(r)g 2 (d)dS. Having approximated the terms J x (u), the approximation of the connection probability of the receiver at high transmission rates R t is rather trivial. It can be done using different expansions for the term γg(r) 1+γg(r) at small and large distances r. The connection probability of the receiver at the corner is
The quality of the above approximation for the connection probability is illustrated in Fig. 6 , set of blue curves.
The connection probability in the bulk for a high transmission rate R t can be approximated following the same steps with equation ( Lemma 4. For secrecy rate R s = 0 and small distance separation u between the receiver and the eavesdropper, the transmission rates R t = log 2 (1 + γ) maximizing the probability of secure connectivity in the bulk and at the corner are related as γ * bu = 2 −η γ * co . Proof. Using the leading order γ 2/η in equation (23) and equation (28) , the probability of secure connecticity at the corner can be approximated as the difference between two exponentials, P sc co ≈ e −λc1γ 2/η −e −λc2γ 2/η . This kind of function accepts a maximum at γ * co = log(c2/c1)
. For η = 4, we get γ * co = 11025 log(54/35)
, which is close to the value seen in Fig. 6 . Similarly, the transmission rate maximizing the probability of secure connectivity in the bulk is γ * bu = log(c2/c1)
, thus γ * bu = 2 −η γ * co . Recall that in Lemma 3 the plane has been divided into three areas w.r.t. to the distance r from the receiver, i.e., r ≤ r 0 , r 0 < r < r 1 and r ≥ r 1 . The extension of Lemma 3 for positive secrecy rates R s > 0 is tedious because for µ = σ we need to separate between more cases while identifying the areas where the terms µg(r) and σg(d) accept different expansions. Apart from that, the proof will follow exactly the same steps with Lemma 3.
In Fig. 7a we see that the probability of secure connectivity is higher in the bulk for low transmission rates R t (corresponding to µ = 1) confirming Lemma 1, and higher at the corner for high transmission rates (corresponding to µ = 10), confirming Lemma 3. Same behaviour is observed for R s = 0 in Fig. 7b , where we see that for increasing distance separation between the receiver and the eavesdropper, the receiver performance at the corner outweighs the performance in the bulk over a wider range of transmission rates R t .
V. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY − KNOWN CSI
Let us denote by f (γ r , γ e ) and F (γ r , γ e ) the PDF and the Cummulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the joint SIR distribution at the receiver and the eavesdropper, where the dependency on the location is omitted for brevity. The inner integral in equation (2) can be read as 
where in (a) we have changed the order of integration, (b) uses that F (∞, γ e ) = F e (γ e ), see for instance [28, Chapter 6] , with F e (γ e ) being the CDF of the SIR at the eavesdropper, and (c) uses that F e (γ) = 1 − E e −γz −1 Ix,e(u) , F (γ, γ) = E 1−e −γz −1 Ix,e(u) 1−e −γIx,r , and J x (u, γ) stands for the joint connection probability of the receiver and the eavesdropper given in equation (12) for µ = σ γ. Equation (30) indicates that for computing the average secrecy capacity with known CSI one has to integrate the probability of secure connectivity in equation (11) for µ = σ γ over the derivative of the rate function. Another way to put equation (30) is to see that the transmitter has to sacrifice some of its rate to achieve PLS, and the amount of loss depends on the location of the receiver, the eavesdropper and the interference effects, incorporated into the quantity J x (u, γ).
where the average transmission rate without secrecy is
1+γ dγ, see for instance [29] , and F r (γ) is the CDF of the SIR at the receiver.
For independent interference at the receiver and the eavesdropper, F (γ, γ) = F e (γ) F r (γ), and the analysis in [25, Equation (12)] is confirmed. In Fig. 8 capacity with secrecy after evaluating equation (31) numerically. The results are also verified by simulations. We see that placing the receiver at the corner offers higher average capacity for all distances between the receiver and the eavesdropper, even if the intensity of interferers is four times higher than the intensity of interferers in the bulk.
Lemma 5. The average secrecy capacity with known CSI at the transmitter is higher when the receiver is located at the corner than in the bulk even if the intensity of interferers at the corner is four times higher.
Proof. Based on equation (30), it suffices to show that the probability of secure connectivity for µ = σ γ is higher at the corner than in the bulk for all γ. This is possible to show as follows: Firstly, for a high γ and a small distance u, the probability of secure connectivity at the corner can be expressed, according to Lemma 3, as P sc co (λ) ≈ e −λc1γ 2/η −e −λc2γ 2/η e −λc3uγ 1/η . In the bulk, the probability < P sc co (λ) due to the fact that c 3 > 0 ∀η > 2. Only in the limit γ → ∞, we get that P sc co (λ) = P sc bu λ 4 . If the distance separation is large, we can use the approximations in Lemma 2, P sc co (λ) ≈ e −xγ 2/η 1 − E Z e −xγ 2/η z −2/η −yγ 1/η z −1/η and P sc bu λ 4 ≈ e −xγ 2/η 1 − E Z e −xγ 2/η z −2/η , thus P sc bu λ 4 < P sc co (λ) for y > 0. Secondly, for a low γ, the probability of secure connectivity is dominated by the mean interference at the eavesdropper, see equation (15) . Due to the scaled intensity of users, the mean interference at the receiver is equal at the corner and in the bulk, however, the mean interference at the eavesdropper is higher at the boundary for u > 0 than in the bulk. Therefore P sc bu λ 4 < P sc co (λ) for a low γ too. Example illustration using numerical integration of equation (11) is available in Fig. 9 .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have calculated the probability of secure connectivity and the average secrecy capacity in a Poisson field of interferers. The receiver performance has been assessed in the infinite plane and also at the corner of a quadrant, and the results have been compared. The analysis shows that hiding the receiver at the corner can provide secrecy enhancement for high dara rate applications. Exposing the receiver at less interference than the eavesdropper is beneficial for physical layer security, even if the boundaries enhance the spatial correlation of interference. On the other hand, for low-rate applications, the impact of boundaries is detrimental because the interference level is reduced overall, and the eavesdropper can mostly decode the low-rate transmissions. In that case, applying further secrecy enhancement techniques, e.g., transmission of jamming signals could be of use to increase the interference level at the boundary. Studying the performance of secrecy enhancement techniques over finite areas, also with more complex geometries, is a direction for future work.
APPENDIX
The distance between the transmitter and the eavesdropper, e jθ − u , ranges in |u − 1| , 1 + u 2 . After deriving the distance distribution, one may calculate that for 0 < u < 2, the distance is smaller than one with probability p = 4 π arctan 2−u 2+u . Due to the fact that the distancebased pathloss becomes equal to unity for distances smaller than one, the RV Z for 0 < u < 2 follows the mixture distribution f Z (z) = p δ(z − 1) + (1 − p) f Zc (z), where δ (·) is the Dirac delta function. The PDF of the continuous RV Z c = e jΘ − u −η : Z c < 1 can be derived from the distance distribution and it is equal to
where z 1 = 1 + u 2 − η 2 and z 2 = 1. For distances u ≥ 2, we get p = 0, and the RV Z becomes continuous in [z 1 , z 2 ] where z 2 = (u − 1) −η .
The computation of the mean link gain can take a compact form for pathloss exponent η = 4. We give below the expressions for the mean link gain for u ≥ 2. For u < 2, we give the mean of the continuous part of the distribution
, u ≥ 2. (1−p)π(u 2 −1) 3 + 2u(2−(1+u 2 ) √ 4−u 2 ) (1−p)π(u 2 −1)(u 4 −1) , 0 < u < 1.
